Damages -- The Not So Blessed  Blessed Event by Bryan, Richard J.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 46 | Number 4 Article 15
6-1-1968
Damages -- The Not So Blessed "Blessed Event"
Richard J. Bryan
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard J. Bryan, Damages -- The Not So Blessed "Blessed Event", 46 N.C. L. Rev. 948 (1968).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol46/iss4/15
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
clearly limited its holding to wrongful death cases, 40 the same reasons
would seem to exist for application of the holding in personal in-
jury cases in which an element of damages recoverable relates to
lost future earnings. But, the reasons are much more compelling in
the case of wrongful death because there the damage award is
primarily, if not entirely, based on loss of future earnings.
The Brooks decision represents a commendable effort to render
"reasonable justice" in spite of many practical problems of tax com-
putation and in the face of the prevailing line of authority. It is
hoped that the decision will prompt courts which have not resolved
the issue to follow suit when the issue is presented, and prompt
others to revaluate their current stand.
PATRICK H. POPE
Damages-The Not So Blessed "Blessed Event"
"[T]he birth of a child may be something less than the 'blessed
event.' . . ."1 said a California Court of Appeals in Custodio v.
Bauer. The context out of which the case arose is not unique but
the attitude of the court differed from similar cases where the courts
adhered to more traditional concepts of the family structure.
Plaintiff in Custodio underwent a salpingectomy, a female
sterilization operation,' after she and her husband decided to limit
their family for health and economic4 reasons. After the operation
Co., 200 F. Supp. 183 (D. Conn. 1961); Meehan v. Central R.R. Co., 181
F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
•273 F. Supp. at 632.
'Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rept. 463, 475 (Ct. App. 1967).
2Id. at 475.
Couples wishing to prevent conception through sterilization usually
have the operation performed on the husband for the reason that a male
sterilization (vasectomy) is a relatively simple procedure that can be per-
formed with a local anesthetic in a doctor's office. A salpingectomy on the
other hand is classified as major surgery and carries with it a certain risk
of death, although the operation is simplified if performed immediately after
child-bearing. However, recanalization, the process whereby the body
naturally overcomes the effects of sterilization, occurs more frequently after
a vasectomy than a salpingectomy. Because recanalization would be a valid
defense to a cause of action based on negligence or malpractice when a
pregnancy results after a sterilization operation, the plaintiff would have
an easier time overcoming the defense in an unsuccessful salpingectomy.




she became pregnant with her tenth child. Mrs. Custodio and her
husband sued on the basis of negligence, malpractice, fraud and
deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. In ad-
dition to other damages plaintiffs prayed for special damages in the
sum of 50,000 dollars for the expense of rearing the child.5 De-
fendants demurred, inter alia, on the grounds that: (1) Pregnancy,
birth of child, and cost and expense of delivery and rearing are not
legally cognizable; (2) breach of duty was not the proximate cause
of the pregnancy. The trial court sustained the general demurrer
whereupon the plaintiff appealed successfully to the court of ap-
peals which overruled the demurrer and remanded the case for
trial. This note will consider the legal problems concerning the
50,000 dollar claim for the support and rearing expenses of the un-
wanted child.
Courts have consistently denied recovery for the cost of rearing
a child' on the theory that a child's birth is a "blessed event" and
that the happiness derived from rearing a child far outweighs the
financial liability.7 The court in Cwstodio thought it premature to
discuss such questions because the issue would become moot if the
plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of proof.' However, in dis-
'From the plaintiff's complaint: "That the birth of plaintiff's child will
require of the plaintiff, additional costs and expenses to properly care for
and raise the said child to the age of maturity, that said cost is estimated to
be in the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) over said period of
time, which constitutes additional special damages to this plaintiff."
' However, several courts have avoided the issue by disposing of the
case by other means, or addressing themselves to other issues. See, e.g.,
Doerr v. Villate, 14 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
" Consider for instance the language in Christensen v. Thornby, 192
Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), where the court denied recovery to a
couple who had a child after a vasectomy (motivated by concern for the
wife's health), but where the child and mother survived nicely. The court
said: "The purpose of the operation was to save the wife from the hazards
to her life which were incident to childbirth. It was not the alleged pur-
pose to save the expense incident to pregnancy and delivery. The wife has
survived. Instead of losing his wife, the plaintiff has been blessed with the
fatherhood of another child. The expenses alleged are incident to the bearing
of a child, and their avoidance is remote from the avowed purpose of the
operation. As well inight the plaintiff charge defendant with the cost of
nurture and education of the child during its minority." Id. at 126, 255
N.W. at 622 (emphasis added). See also Doerr v. Villate, 14 IIl. App. 2d
332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966); Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530
(1947); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming Co.
1957), criticized in 19 U. Pirr. L. Ruv. 802 (1958); Ball v. Mudge, 64
Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
' Determination of principles of public policy which are claimed to
render certain consequences of proved wrongful acts and omissions
1968]
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cussing "criteria" for the remand of the case the court left little
doubt which way it would decide the issue should the danger of
mootness pass. The court noted that despite precedent denying
recovery, the same precedent demonstrated that birth is not always
a "blessed event." The court then stated the crux of its predisposi-
tions by saying, "With fear being echoed that Malthus was indeed
right, there is some trend of change in social ethics with respect to
the family establishment."'
Clearly there are many unwanted children born in wedlock.
The ever increasing use of and demand for birth control devices evi-
dences this fact. The truism that most couples will naturally love
and care for the unwanted child does not alter the fact that it is un-
wanted or that they would have been happier without it.1" These
family planning motivations distinguish Clustodio from earlier
cases denying recovery for unwanted child support in which sole
considerations of health motivated the sterilization.'1 In Clestodio
the plaintiffs apparently wished to limit the family for economic
reasons as well.12 It may be argued that the damages should be
commensurate with the injuries anticipated. Thus if a couple has a
sterilization operation for reasons of health and due to the doctor's
malpractice the woman bears another child which injures or kills
her, a right of action is maintainable against the doctor.13 Sim-
noncompensable may best await the proof of the elements of damage
claimed by the plaintiffs. The failure to prove an actionable wrong,
or the failure to show injuries of the nature alleged, would render
further pursuit of the subject moot.
59 Cal. Rept. at 468.
Indeed, the court took one paragraph to state the above (i.e., that it was
premature to decide), and then spent four pages discussing "criteria"-or,
in other words, what it would have decided if it were time to decide.
59 Cal. Rept. at 477.
"0 One commentator has said:
Moreover the fact that the parents love this child and feel responsible
for its welfare once it has been born does not mean that they would
not have been generally happier without it or that its birth constitutes
a "blessed event" in every way. An inability to provide for and edu-
cate their previously born children as they anticipated or to maintain
a higher standard of living once contemplated may be a constant
source of sorrow for which the joy derived from the newest child
compensates only inadequately.
113 U. PA. L. Rnv. 415, 435-36 n.79 (1965).
" See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620(1934) ; Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
1 See supra note 4.
Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); West v. Under-
wood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945).
[Vol. 46
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ilarly if a couple's motive is not only that of health but also of
economic considerations, and the unwanted child increases the eco-
nomic burden, then a right of action for child support should also
be maintainable against the doctor. Ideally one should be able to
contract for what one wants, and to recover for the foreseeable
consequences of someone else's negligence. The shock and frus-
tration of having an unexpected and unwanted child may have
psychological repercussions on the parents. Indeed it could be
said that to some extent the dignity of the human person is vio-
lated by upsetting a couple's rights to choose its family's size. 4
It follows that relieving the economic burden of the unwanted
child would assuage the unhappy situation which the couple sought
to avoid and would have avoided but for the negligence or mis-
representation of the doctor. Yet an eventual decision allowing such
recovery for unwanted child support would seem to embrace more
fundamental issues.' 5
Courts have long recognized that considerations other than the
Cf. 46 N.C.L. Rnv. 205, 208-212 (1967).
One "fundamental issue," however, seems to be well settled-that
voluntary sterilization is not against public policy. Indeed compulsory
sterilization was held to be constitutional for mentally deficient persons in
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); but cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942). In one of the earliest cases resembling Custodio, Christensen
v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), the court decided that
such operations were not against public policy, and the courts have con-
sistently held this position where the legislature has not held to the con-
trary. Two states have afforded statutory protection for doctors performing
voluntary sterilization operations. See N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 90-271 to -75
(Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-423 to -26. See also a proposed stat-
utory code in 113 U. PA. L. REv. 415, 442-43 (1965). Only in those states
where there is a legislative restriction on sterilization (see CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 53-33 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10 to -12 (1961)) would
the courts be unwilling to allow recovery. While these statutory restrictions
may have constitutional problems in light of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), these states could still deny recovery in a tort or contract
suit arising out of a sterilization operation even though they could not con-
stitutionally prohibit the act itself. (For an argument that voluntary
sterilization should be against public policy even in the absence of statutory
dictates, see Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Sur-
gery, 14 RocKY MT. L. REv. 233, 278 (1942)). But judicial acceptance of
voluntary sterilization does not solve the problem of recovery. "It is sub-
mitted . . . that acceptance of sterilization and whether or not damages
should be awarded for the birth of a child following such an operation are
entirely different questions and different policy considerations underlie
each." 9 UTAH L. Rxv. 808, 810 n.6 (1965). Acquiescence by the courts in
one method of birth control is quite a different thing from judicially stamp-
ing a human as unwanted.
19681
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standard of living affect the well-being of the child.16 One such
consideration in unwanted child support cases is that either by neces-
sity or accident the child may become aware of the litigation and
develop into an "emotional bastard."'1 7 Of course the child, espe-
cially as he grows older, may by conjecture develop suspicions that
he was unwanted. However, a child is less likely to become an "emo-
tional bastard" when he may have some vague notion that his parents'
family planing scheme went astray, than when he discovers that he
is a 50,000 dollar judicially declared burden.' This being the case,
would the 50,000 dollar demanded by Custodio compensate for the
mental anguish the child may suffer upon making the discovery?
If not, should a married couple be allowed to claim that their child
is unwanted ?"0
Even if it would be permissible to claim that the child is un-
wanted, a recovery for support of the unwanted child presents some
interesting contrasts when juxtaposed with the measure of damages
in wrongful death actions. When a parent sues for the wrongful
death of a child, the damages are computed by subtracting the cost
of his support from the value of the enjoyment, affection and ser-
vices that would have been derived from the child had he lived.
Recovery is possible because the courts have assumed that the latter
is a greater sum than the former.2" If the latter figure becomes less
when the child is unwanted, it may be argued that a couple who re-
10 Most notably, of course, the rights of the natural parents. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Nelson v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 75 N.W.2d 786 (1956).
17For a -well stated argument for this position, see 9 UTAH L. REv. 808,
811-12 (1965).
" The Custodio court, however, did not make this distinction. The court
dismissed the "emotional bastard" argument by saying:
The emotional injury to the child can be no greater than that to be
found in many families where "planned parenthood" has not followed
the blueprint .... One cannot categorically say whether the tenth
arrival in the Custodio family will be more emotionally upset if he
arrives in an environment where each of the other members of the
family must contribute to his support, or whether he will have a
happier and more well-adjusted life if he brings with him the where-
withal to make it possible.
59 Cal. Rept. at 477.9 Thus, just as a married couple may not normally testify to non-
access in order to show the illegitimacy of their child, it might be
argued that the plaintiffs . * . should not be allowed to claim ... that a
child born of their marriage was unwanted, burdensome, and caused
by a doctor's negligence or breach of warranty.
9 UTAH L. REv. 808, 813 (1965).




covered for the support of an unwanted child should not be allowed
to recover for the wrongful death of the same child, or at least
should not be permitted to claim more than nominal damages. In
addition, if a child is only slightly unwanted it is possible that the
two figures may be equal and the couple would be unable to claim
damages in either unwanted child support or wrongful death as
each off-sets the other. Indeed, would not judicial acceptance of the
proposition that the life of a child may sometimes be more a burden
than a blessing require investigation into every wrongful death action
to discover whether it was truly a tragic event or the happy relief of
an unwanted burden? Should a couple suing for wrongful death of
their child be forced to go through the agonizing and preposterous
proof that they loved the child more than the going rate in unwanted
child support actions? Or for that matter should the courts tolerate
couples in unwanted child support cases attempting to prove how
little they love the child in order to maximize the recovery? More
is involved than a mere legal anomaly. The contradiction between
recovery in wrongful death and unwanted child support embraces
two irreconcilable concepts of the dignity and value of human life.
These concepts highlight the question of whether the courts
should venture into this delicate area of family structure. Judicial
cognizance of the fact that a child is unwanted, however well quali-
fied and limited, could cause a subtle weakening in the family struc-
ture by lay misinterpretation of the purpose and meaning of the
court's opinion. In short, the issue may be too subjective2' to be
handled properly by even the most adept court. As expressed by
one writer: "There are some wrongs which must be suffered and
the law cannot provide a remedy for them. To attempt to do so may
do more social damage than if the law leaves them alone."'
22
But regardless of whether the "Blessed Eventors" or the "Non-
Blessed Eventors" win the debate, courts should treat this type of
recovery as sui generis. Decisions and considerations concerning
certain analogous topics such as "wrongful life" should have only
limited bearing. The "wrongful life" cases involve a suit by an
1 Even the prerequisite decision that voluntary sterilization is not against
public policy (see note 15, supra) would not be accepted by a large num-
ber of people. Many religions, especially Roman Catholic, take the position
that sterilization for any purpose is against the natural law and morally
wrong. See 31 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1170, 1181-82 (1956).
,Ploscowe, An Action for "Wrongful Life," 38 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1078,
1080 (1963).
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illegitimate against those responsible for his birth for the recovery
of damages inflicted by the fact of being illegitimate (e.g., suit by
the bastard son against his father) .2s The court in Citstodio tended
to commingle the "wrongful life" cases. As the court said: "The
ramifications of this case also embrace the subject of 'wrongful
life.' "24 The defendant also raised the issue of "wrongful life" on
petition for rehearing, arguing that the "wrongful life" cases, which
generally have been unsuccessful, established that the fact of life
itself could not be a ground for recovery. Yet the principles and
policies involved in "wrongful life" and unwanted child support
have more differences than similarities. The desired deterrent
effect 5 in "wrongful life" actions (i.e., curbing extramarital sexual
activity2 6 or lessening carelessness on the part of guardians of non
sui juris women27) is quite different from that in unwanted child
support (i.e., discouraging doctors from being negligent in perform-
ing sterilization operations). Moreover a court that disallows recov-
ery in unwanted child support because of the fear that the child may
become an "emotional bastard" or that such a recovery would be dis-
ruptive of the family structure would not be inconsistent in allow-
ing "wrongful life" recovery to a real bastard who obviously knows
"The term "wrongful life" was coined by the court in Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
945 (1964). In Zepeda, a bastard son sued his father for damages received
by the stigma of going through life as an illegitimate. The court, while
acknowledging a wrong, refused recovery because the ramifications of the
decision would be so far reaching that such an innovation, it was felt by the
court, should be pursued by the legislature. However, in Williams v. State,
46 Misc. 2824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965) the New York court did
not exercise such judicial restraint. In that case there was a suit by a bastard
child against a state-run mental hospital for negligence in allowing an in-
mate to rape the child's mother. However, this decision was later reversed
in a pithy two-paragraph opinion, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966). For extensive
comment on these cases see 28 ALBANY L. REV. 174 (1964); 49 IOWA L. REV.
1005 (1964); 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1078 (1963); 25 OHo ST. L.J. 145 (1964);
18 STAN. L. REv. 530 (1966); 112 U. PA. L. REv. 780 (1964).
2"59 Cal. Rept. at 476 n.11 (1967).
"See W. PRossER, ToRTs 23 (3d ed. 1964).
" It is questionable whether one who gives into his lusts in spite of pos-
sible claims of child support in paternity suits, theological condemnation,
social stigma, personal frustration and guilt, possible criminal penalties, and
the danger of venereal disease, is likely to be deterred because of a possible
"wrongful life" action.
7 Mental institutions could probably not avoid such incidents as occurred
in Willianm without interfering with the vital group therapy treatment.
The likely result, if suits multiplied, would be the dispensing of birth control
pills to the female inmates.
[Vol. 46
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that he was unwanted and who was never a part of a traditional
"family structure." Nonetheless it seems more likely that a court
will grant recovery in unwanted child support while denying it in
"wrongful life." This is because unwanted child support does not
entail the crippling problem present in "wrongful life" actions.
The difficulty of granting recovery in "wrongful life" is an in-
ternal paradox peculiar to the action. It is not a situation where
the child would have been legitimate but for the actions of defen-
dant which made him illegitimate, but rather the child is illegitimate
where but for the actions of the defendant he would not have been
at all. The defendant, however wrong or negligent he may have
been, did bestow the gift of life upon the child.28 Unless the il-
legitimate child is a thanatomaniac he has no cause to complain.2 9
The situation in Custodio is quite different. Here the plaintiff is not
questioning the value of his own life but that of another person to
whom he has legal and moral responsibilities. One can not be bur-
dened with one's own existence but one can be burdened with some-
one else's existence. Recovery should be denied in "wrongful life"
because the value of a person's life to himself is almost infinite (lim-
ited only by the concept of an afterlife), while the disadvantages of
life whether they be illegitimacy, poverty, or physical or mental30
deformity are always somewhat less than infinite, and thus there can
never be any net damage.3 But the value of someone's else's life
"8 As one writer summarized, referring to the Williams case:
She, as the genetic product of a particular man and woman, both in-
stitutionalized for mental care, either had to be born illegitimate o-
not at all. When a court recognizes a cause of action under these
circumstances, is it acknowledging no life as the preferred alterna-
tive? If so, is it also giving its approval to abortion in cases where
the disadvantages of being born are thought by the court to out-
weigh the advantages? .... Or is the court adhering to traditional
views that life under any circumstances is a positive benefit, but
that the bastard nevertheless should recover damages for purposes
of deterring the defendant's conduct?
18 STAN. L. REV. 530, 533 (1966).
29 Cf. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 920 (1939).
"Anyone who was ever moved by John Steinbeck's OF MICE AND MEN
would testify to the dignity of life, however retarded in intelligence.
" The New York court in reversing the Williams decision (see note 23
supra) took a somewhat different tack, saying that the damages, if any,
would be impossible to measure:
In essence, and regardless of the verbiage of the claim above quoted,
the damages asserted rest upon the very fact of conception and would
have to comprehend the infirmities inherent in claimant's situation as
against the alternative of a void, if nonbirth and nonexistence may be
1968]
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is not limitless to another person.32 The burdens which the other
person imposes may well outweigh the benefits he might bestow.A3
It does not necessarily follow from the above that recovery should
be allowed in Custodio. It is merely to stress that the difficult ironies
in the "wrongful life" cases are not present in this case. It is for
this reason that the court would do well to keep the "wrongful life"
cases on the periphery of the decision making process. Recovery in
Custodio and other unwanted child support cases would not be in-
ternally paradoxical. Recovery would depend on whether, in judicial
opinion, the subjective fear of undermining family life and psy-
chologically harming the child is outweighed by the objective finan-
cial damage to the plaintiff. It is this question that the court must
consider if it receives the case again on appeal.
RiCHARD J. BRYAN
Domestic Relations-Custody-Evidence-Has the Polar Star
Been Obscured by Statute in North Carolina?
"[T]he welfare of the child is the polar star by which the dis-
cretion of the court is to be guided. . . ." This oft quoted2 phrase
appears to be the guiding precept for the North Carolina courts in
custody cases except where it collides with the conflicting policy of
judicial economy.'
expressed; and could not, without incursion into the metaphysical, be
measured against the hypothesis of a child or imagined entity in some
way identifiable with claimant but of normal and lawful parentage and
possessed of normal or average advantages.
269 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (1966).
', To use an extreme example: The value of the life of someone at-
tacking an innocent victim with a knife would be de minimis from the view-
point of the innocent victim.
"One commentary glossed over this distinction. Referring to Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964), an unwanted child support
case, and Zepeda, the writer said:
In both... the claim is essentially that life could be damaging. Viewed
in this light, the claims seem contrary to a concept, fundamental to our
legal system, that life is inherently valuable. The practical importance
of all ramifications of this concept may be doubted in view of the cur-
rent population explosion. However, it is only realistic to consider that
it would seem extraordinary for a court to declare that life under any
adverse condition or to any person could be damaging.
9 UTAH L. Rav. 808, 814 n.37 (1965).
In re Lewis, 88 N.C. 31, 34 (1883).
R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 224 (1963).
* "Should we accept the contentions of the defendant and forbid the use
[VCol. 46
